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EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
By EDWIN- F. ALBERTSWORT
Professor of Law, Northwestern University
A silent transformation is occuring in American constitutibnal institutions. The governmental fabric created by the
Constitution of the United States, though popularly regarded
as a Rock of Gibralter, has not escaped the erosive effect of
Time. Like the evolution of the laws embodied in the Twelve
Tables, like the restatements of the Mosaic Code by Talmudic
interpretations, like the credal formulations of Holy Writ by
the Church Fathers, present-day practices in government in
American federalism have became strata overlying the original
textual enactments of the Constitution which, in some instances,
have resulted in a Pompeian disappearance of that which was
once regarded as fixed and absolute. These developments are
illustrative of the truth that the genius and destiny of the
American people as exemplified in their governmental practices
are not to be confined within four corners of a written instrument as a constitution.1 Usages, judicial construction of the
text of the Constitution, and practical adaptation to unforeseen
needs of government so that its processes may smoothly function, have resulted in the creation of so-called "extra-constitutional" government in the United States. They are practices
of government which cannot be found either expressly, or
implicitly, by analysis from other functions, within the formal
Constitution; but, on the other hand, they cannot be said to be
expressly or impliedly prohibited by that document. Hence,
they may be conveniently, and not without a reasonable degree
of accuracy, designated "extra-constitutional"
practices
flourishing alongside the Constitution; in fact, as it were, beyond
the pale of the written Charter. They result in one government
"in the books," and another "in action"; a "visible" government versus an "invisible" one.
The reasons for the development and continual existence of
extra-constitutional government may be said to be two-fold. In
the first place, until a case or controversy in the justiciable sense

I James M. Beck, in his "Foreword" to my "Cases on Constitutional Government" (1930), pp. ili-iv.
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can be presented to the judiciary in the federal scheme of government-in constitutional as distinguished from legislative
courts-no challenge can be made of the constitutionality of
these extra-constitutional institutions or practices.2 A person
musil show himself aggrieved or damnified in his right in order
to frame an issue cognizable by a proper court having jurisdiction because of an alleged extra-constitutional practice of government; and federal courts generally, and most of the State
courts, have no general or abstract veto powers, powers in thesi,
over legislation or practice of government where no such issue
can be presented. Thus, without the ambit of the written Constitution, a governmental practice or an institutional control
can grow and flourish unmolested by judicial inhibitions which
alone are effective in overthrowing, or at least questioning, practices and usages alleged to be extra-constitutional. A second
reason making for the evolution of these "outlaw" forms of
government is to be found in the fact that practical statesmen
and politicians, acting under a theory that what was not prohibited in the formal Constitution, was impliedly authorized as
means for the execution of granted powers, created in various
instances a "super-government" unknown to the written Constitution, even though not prohibited by it. Constitutionally,
such a viewpoint is unsound if it include powers not delegated
to the Federal Government, for that Government is one of
granted, not prohibited, power. On the other hand, it is true
that choice of means in carrying on, or executing, the powers
delegated, makes for wide latitude of discretion in adopting
practices of government, or in execution of policies of administration, that may make for extra-constitutional developments.
Theodore Roosevelt, in his "Autobiography,' '3 stated his conception of the powers of the Presidency to be all those not
expressly prohibited by the Federal Constitution; for the people
had granted to the Chief Executive, in the Constitution itself,
all executive powers, and had not limited these, as they had in
granting legislative powers to Congress by the qualification
"herein granted." If Aix. Roosevelt meant that within the
general scope of Federal Government, within the circle of its
' Cf. "The Supreme Court and the Superstructure of the Constitution," 16 American Bar Association Journal, 565.
'Pp. 551-552, and pp. 466 et seq.; pp. 388-389, 394.
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operation, he had all executive powers not expressly prohibited,
there is truth in his position. On the other hand, Mr. Taft has
criticized the Rooseveltian position, in his book "Our Chief
Magistrate and his Powers," 4 by saying that such viewpoint
contradicted the entire constitutional fabric of the Federal Government as a government solely of granted powers, leaving to
the States or their people all those powers not granted. In this
Mr. Taft was constitutionally correct, if Mr. Roosevelt is taken
at his word, without reading into his viewpoint the interpretation already mentioned. However this may be, the real point is
that numerous governmental practices not prohibited by the
Constitution have grown up unchallenged by judicial review
solely because no justiciable issue could be framed for this
purpose and under varying conceptions of the nature of the
federal fabric of government.
Some publicists are of opinion that American governmental
evolution is describing a downward curve toward "Avernus";
others feel that a newer and better government is in the making.
The crucible of Time alone will afford the answer. However
this may be, these developments outside the pale of constitutionality seem to be inevitable by-products, in the words of
Woodrow Wilson," in the evolution of national life wherever a
written or formal constitution, more or less by its own nature
rigid and unyielding, is the basis of delimitation of governmental power. The kaleidoscope of changing events because
of an incessant flux in practical government due to the complexity of modern industrial civilization and experiments in
government; the myriad factual situations for which there are
no exact or express constitutional provisions, force a gradual
modification of received constitutional doctrines, legal institutions, and theories of government. Changing emphases of one
age, different conceptions of the functions of the State, law and
government, as well as their scope and purpose, cause practices
and institutions to develop outside the canons of constitutional
orthodoxy. Sir Henry Maine, the distinguished Historical
jurist, pointed out this truth so far as the development of legal
"Pp. 139-140.
'"Congressional Government," ch. on The Executivb. In part,
Mr. Wilson said: "We have resorted, almost unconscious of the political
significance of what we did, to extra-constitutional means of modifying
the Federal system where It has proved to be too refined by balances
of divided authority to suit practical uses."
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procedure was concerned, by showing the degree to which legal
fictions were employed to create an appearance of reality when,
as a matter of fact, the fundamental bases for another rule of
law had already occurred. 6 And the great Tarde, in his "Laws
of Imitation," has demonstrated that the new masquerades in
the form of the old in order to make itself more receptive and
overcome the objection of innovation.7 Moreover, a written
instrument of government-such as a constitutin-is generally
not self-executing; there musc be legislation, executive agencies,
administrative officials, judicial interpretation, construction, and
adaptation, to set the machinery of government in motion and to
keep it going; as a result, statutory enactment and constitutional meanings always meet their Waterloo or their Wellington
in enforcing officials and courts.8 Thus, the real Constitution
of the United States will be found, not in the formal instrument
itself, but rather in some 300 volumes of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the "voice of the Constitution," the final arbiter of the formal documnent. In these volumes also will be mirrored many governmental practices
unknown to the written Constitution from a mere reading of it,
but which originate from analysis, historical interpretation and
metaphysical reasoning about the fabric of government created
by it. That a "government of men" will be found as a concomitant of these extra-constitutional practices is inevitable in
modern government under written constitutions. 9 But law and
government cannot exist in vacuo, divorced from practical
experience and human enforcing agencies or the reactions of
human beings for which it is supposed to function.' 0 It is
"Ancient Law," ch. 2. And cf. Smith, "Surviving Fictions," 27
Yale Law Journal, 147, 150; L. L. Fuller, "Legal Fictions," 25 Illinois
Law Review, 363.
'"The Laws of Imitations," pp. 2-3, 11-12, 14-15, 310-320; and see
"Imitative and Apocryphal Reasoning of Courts," 7 Cornell Law
Quarterly, 229.
:1A. H. Throckmorton, "Constitutional Law," 12 Corpus Jurls, 653,
at pp. 729-730, 731-732.

'Wigmore, "A Government of Men, Not Merely of Laws," 24

Illinois Law Review, 895.

"Earle H. Ketcham, "Law as a Body of Subjective Rules," 23

Illinois Law Review, 360. Mr. Ketcham says: "If law is subjective,
as Is here contended, then the law binds no one, and no one obeys laws.
Instead, one obeys Individuals and acts in accordance with laws.

* * * Law never provided for the enforcement of contracts nor for

the payment of damages in ease of torts. All such things are actions

of men and not of law. The demand that the government should be

one of law and not of men Is a demand for the impossible."

(P. 365.)
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equally true of extra-constitutional government. If the complainant can make out his case or controversy challenging these
practices as they affect him in his property or personal rights,
he will have his due process of law in the form of a day in court.
Hence, he has no cause for hostile or unfavorable criticism of
extra-constitutional practices; and if he cannot frame the justiciable issue necessary, he has not been damnifled, and hence,
again, has not been prejudiced. Thus, a great deal of extraconstitutional development, unchallenged from a constitutional
standpoint,1 1 continues in existence.
The practices and usages of extra-constitutional government
have annexed themselves principally around the executive and
legislative functions in the Federal State, largely because these
have been the most active and direct forces of government.
They are the active element in that they create and execute law
in the accepted sense. The judiciary, on the other hand, is the
passive factor in government; for, being confined to justiciable
issues framed by litigants, this branch of government of necessity has remained aloof from those practical, every-day problems where modern government touches the innumerable situations of life. Moreover, the judiciary could hardly, within the
orthodox conception of the judicial function, initiate new relationships between government and its subjects or citizens, or
create usages resting on the habits and customs of the people for
their sanction. The judges can and do create customary modes
of judicial decision, but only in an indirect sense can these
decisions be said to create popular customs or usages resulting
in governmental practices. Thus, there has not been the same
opportunity for that accretion of extra-constitutional development in connection with the judiciary as has been the case with
the other departments of government.
EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL

EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENTS.

Probably the best type of government unknown to the written Constitution, is the Presidential Cabinet. By this is meant
n"When I tell you that less than 50 federal statutes have been
declared invalid by that [Supreme] Court in the history of the government and that thousands of laws have been passed by Congress for
which no possible warrant can be found in the Constitution, you will
appreciate that the Court cannot, or at all events does not, in all
instances defend the Constitution." James M. Beck, "The Changed
Conception of the Constitution," vol. 69, Proceedings of the Amer.
Philos. Socy., p. 111.
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the heads of departments in the Federal Government, as distinguished from the so-called "little" cabinet, or the more
numerous officials who do not head up federal departments, but
who nonetheless are important figures in the execution of federal
law and who are often consulted by the Executive, and who
likewise seek his advice in execution or formulation of administrative policies. Growing out of that article of the Constitution1 2 empowering the Chief Executive to require the opinion
in writing of the "principal officer in each of the executive
departments," there has gradually emerged, in the words of the
late Chief Justice Taft, "an extra-statutory and extra-constitutional body," existing only as long as the President desires its
continuance, because it is the "mere creation of the President's
will. "13 Having himself occupied the position of Chief Executive, Mr. Taft's language is a true description of this institution
of extra-constitutional government. As further stated by Professor Burgess, writing of the same political institution: "The
Cabinet is, therefore, a purely voluntary, extra-legal association
of the heads of the executive departments with the President,
which may be dispensed with at any moment by the President,
and whose resolutions do not legally bind the President in the
slightest degree. They form a privy council, but not a ministry."1 4
Oddly enough, Congress has usually fixed the character and
number of the executive departments from which the President
has chosen his cabinet advisers. So far as the formal Constitution itself is concerned, however, the President is not under duty
to select his advisers from these departments, and, in fact, may
invite anyone he pleases to sit in his cabinet. In Mir. Harding's
time, the Vice-President, Mr. Coolidge, was so requested, and did
sit for some time, in the cabinet. But custom, usage, political
expediency, and party obligations have, on the other hand, been
controlling factors in the choice of cabinet members, more or
less binding Presidential action. If an occasion should ever
present itself permitting formulation of a case or controversy
challenging the constitutional existence of this extra-constitutional body-whieh seems unthinkable-it is probably safe to
"Article II, sec. 2.
'"Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers," p. 30 (ed. 1916).
""Political Science and Constitutional Law"
(ed. 1891), vol. 2,
p. 263.
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predict that no attack would be successful, in the courts. For,
under the broad constitutional duty imposed on the Chief Executive to execute the federal laws, wide discretion would be
allowed him in the means chosen by him to carry out this duty
as well as others required of him by analogous provisions of the
written Constitution.
Another extra-constitutional development has been witnessed in the election of the Chief Executive, by voting for presidential electors. Present agitation of a more or less organized
fashion, is seeking to make formally written-as well as to provide for assumption of office by the newly-elected incumbent
shortly after his election-a usage that has grown up outside
the written Constitution. 5 This is the practice of really voting
for contestant Presidential nominees directly, in that the Presidential electors no longer exercise any reasoned or discretionary
judgment of their own when casting their ballots in the electoral
college, but mechanically, cast their vote according to the dictates of their constituents. Thus, the electoral college, of which
these electors themselves aie the constituents, is an institution
that has become obsolete, although the written Constitution
knows no other method of choosing a President of the United
States. However, by voting for Presidential electors in the
several States, it is possible for the will of the majority of the
people to be defeated, as a candidate might have a plurality of
popular votes, but an insufficient number of electoral votes, and
conversely. An interesting, but probably moot, question, and
highly speculative, would be whether or not attack would lie by
a defeated candidate because of this extra-constitutional practice,
enjoining, for example, Presidential electors from casting their
ballots according to the vote of the electorate, but instead requiring them to act independently. Difficulties of judicial enforcement of such a procedure, assuming jurisdiction were taken,
would seem to answer the question without further argument.
Woodrow Wilson, in his work on "Congressional Government,"
speaking of this practice of indirect election of the Chief Exeeutive, says "Once the functions of a presidential elector were
very august. He was to speak for the people; they were to
"'Newton D. Baker, "Some Constitutional Problems," 11 Amer.
Bar Assn. Journ. 540; and see Resolution of House of Representatives,
explained and discussed by Hon. Clarence F. Lea, of California, Cong.
Rec. vol. 69, pp. 669-671.
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accept his judgment as theirs. He was to be as eminent in the
qualities which win trust as was the greatest of the Imperial
Electors in the power which inspires fear. But now he is merely
a registering machine-a sort of bell-punch to the hand of his
party convention. It gives the pressure and he rings. It is,
therefore, patent to everyone that that portion of the Constitution which prescribes his functions is as though it were not." 16
It has been wittily said that the electoral college is like the
appendix verrniformis in the human anatomy,-its only possible
function being to obstruct. 17 This may be an exaggerated
viewpoint, but nevertheless the popular method which is now
followed under constitutional requirement really covers up the
fact that quite another political institution has actually occurred, unknown to the formal Constitution, an extra-constitutional
phenomenon. Perhaps, in future, when and if a constitutional
convention convenes for general study of constitutional amendments-if the people can be persuaded that such a convention
can with safety be called-this obsolete institution of the electoral college will be eliminated from the formal instrument of
government. But if not, it has in truth already been eliminated
by popular usage, acquiesced in by the presidential electors.
In relation to other departments of Government in the
Federal system, the Executive power has worked out certain
usages unknown to the formal Constitution, even though not
prohibited by it. Of these, perhaps, the most striking is the
relationship to the Senate. Because of this development, the
Senate, as a body, is not a potent force in the initiation of nominations for public office by means of advice to the Chief Executive-although the words of the written Constitution are "by
and-with the advice and consent of the Senate'"--and the same
is true of the formulation of policies of treaty negotiation or
execution of administrative policies. In the early days of the
Republic, when the Senate was a much smaller body so far as
members went, the notion was that it should be a consultative
body, a ministry or council of State, which probably explains
why the Constitution provided for advice from that body to the
President. The reason why the Senate was to approve treaties,
S
Supra,
note 5.
ITJ. F. Jameson, "Introduction to the Study of the Constitutional
and Political History of the States" (ed. 1886), p. 13.

KENTUCKY LAW JouaNAL

said Hamilton,18 was because secrecy was desirable, and a
smaller body representing the component States, like the Senate,
was preferable to a larger one such as the House. But the
expansion of the nation, and the present practice of popular
election of Senators, even though they are thought of as representing the State in its corporate capacity, has brought into
desuetude any practice of governing in connection with the
Chief Executive by means of "advice."
Today, except as the
President may in advance consult certain individual Senators
of influence, in order to secure the approval of the requisite
number for subsequent submission of nominations or treaties,
all formulation of treaties, initiation of nominations to public
office under the United States, as well as formulation of policies
in general, are undertaken without obtaining pyior advice from
the Senate. 19 In an indirect sense, of course, the Senate gives
advice, for by refusing to approve when submitted, the President is informed negatively that the Senate's advice through
consultation with certain Senators of influence, or party leaders,
had better been obtained ab initio. The presidential practice,
attacked as unconstitutional by some, 20 of appointing a number
of key Senators on commissions to negotiate treaties, is a recognition on the part of the Chief Executive that from practical
considerations the Senate may not be ignored even in matters of
advice, indirect though it may be. Constitutionally, however,
negotiation as an act is solely the function of the President, as
the affairs of state have eventually evolved.
To buttress and maintain this strong position of independence on the part of the Executive, there has been created a doctrine of "affairs of State" which may prevent the Senate from
obtaining documents or securing information from the various
departments that would enable it to pass resolutions or reject
nominations or treaties, if the President refuses to grant such
information, thus preventing the Senate's giving effectual advice
23The Federalist (Lodge's Ed.) No. 75, pp. 468, 469. And see P.
G. Caffey, "Federal Executive Power," 95 Cent. Law Journ. 3, 9.
"Dewhurst, "Does the Constitution Make the President Sole
Negotiator of Treaties?" 30 Yale Law Journ. 478; Brandeis, J., dissenting, in Myers v. United States (1926, 272 U. S. 52, at pp. 264, 265.
"Ex-Senator George F. Hoar, "The Autobiography of Seventy
Years," vol. 2, pp. 47-50; D. F. Fleming, "The Treaty Veto of the
American Senate," p. 32.
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in a positive way on governmental affairs to the President. 21
The recent conflict between Senators and President Hoover
over submission of so-called secret understandings between the
President or Secretary of State and the Government of Great
Britain over the proposed limitation of naval armaments, is only
a recurrence of other similar controversies throughout the
national history. 22 Quite naturally, the contention of the
Senate is that it cannot adequately perform its function of
approval of treaties, or nominations to public office, unless it
has all the documents pertinent to the issues. On the other
hand, the President in his superior position of contact with
foreign powers, and his intimate acquaintance-in theory at
least-with the qualifications of nominees for public office, may
in certain instances feel that the public welfare would be
jeopardized should he divulge matters of certain character.
Precedent and sound governmental practice and policy support
the President in this position. The Senate may exercise its constitutional right, in retaliation, by refusing to approve a treaty,
or approve it subject to reservations, or reject a nominee submitted by the President, and this may cause embarrassment to
the Chief Executive; but that is the extent of the power of the
Senate, to object.
This doctrine of presidential independence has not had
judicial recognition in any express precedent, but it would probably receive the judicial blessing were a justiciable issue ever
presented so that it could be properly raised; for being so well
entrenched in usage, it seems improbable the courts would refuse
to recognize it, or would rqview the President's determination
that 'ffairs of State precluded access by the Senate to certain
types of information. The well-established doctrine of judicial
non-review of so-called "political" 2 3 questions would argue
strongly for protection from attack under the Constitution of
this extra-constitutional practice. Nonetheless, an impartial
observer without knowledge of this development might carefully
search the written Constitution and not become conversant with
this practice or that of no longer consulting the Senate as a body
2 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 8, 376381; 3 Willoughby, "The Constitution of the United States" (2d. ed.),
p. 1490.
"United States Daily, July 9, 1930.
"M. F. Weston, "Political Questions," 38 Harvard Law Review, 296.
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for advice in government. Written constitutions or statutes do
not alone mirror all the political institutions, governmental practices, or laws of a given people at a given period of time in their
history. In truth, government and practical politics cannot be
cramped within these written constitutions or statutes, just as
the latter cannot be enforced if strong habits and customs of the
people run counter to them.
Another custom on the part of the President in relation to
making nominations to public office has become well established
-that is, to consult not only individual Senators of the same
political faith with him, but also similar politically minded
members of the lower House.24 Nowhere in the formal Constitution is information given the Chief Executive from what sources
he shall nominate officials for public office under the United
States; hence, what is not forbidden, under the Rooseveltian
theory is impliedly permitted, since there is no new federal power
or authority delegated to the Central Government. As matter
of fact and practice, however, nominations are often made by
other parties than the President, who only formally approves
the nominees, or rubber-stamps them, unless of course the suggested nominee is, in the President's opinion, unfit for the proposed office. Mr. Roosevelt took the position that he would
insist on a certain standard of qualification, but would in other
respects observe the usage already clearly established.2 5 This
has probably also been the attitude of other incumbents of this
high office, though not expresslyf announced. Especially would,
and should, this be the case in appointments to the judiciary or
other positions of responsibility and trust, where sound training,
ability, and high character should be outstanding elements of
qualification. That a President can be mistaken in judging
whether or nbt a nominee measures up to the standard set is not
to be wondered at in view of the hundreds of thousands of offices
lying within his appointive power. 26 Perhaps party loyalties
and pressure from friends and organizations should share the
blame with the President, where there has been any, in cases of
2H. L. West, "Federal Power: Its Growth and Necessity" (ed.
1918), P. 154.
I6J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time" (ed. 1920),
vol. 1, p. 157.
" Caffey, "Federal Executive Power," supra, note 18, pp. 3 and 5,
states, that up to 1921, there were 15,000 Presidential appointees; and
more than 568,000 of all types of appointments to office.
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appointment of men who either were not qualified or who subsequently became disqualified.27 The late Henry Cabot Lodge
justified this presidential practice of consulting individual
Senators of the same political party in making nominations, by
arguing that the Senate was by the Constitution made the adviser
of the President.2 8 In rebuttal, it has been said that the practice ought therefore to include Senators of a different political
persuasion, which is seldom the case, and that it should include
the Senate as a body, and not merely a part. The point has
further been argued that the practice is extra-constitutional in
that it includes among its advisers members of the lower
House. 29 If Mr. Lodge was seeking constitutional justification
for the usage, he gave the wrong reason, rather than no reason,
to support it, as will presently appear. However, this may be,
by means of these usages in nomination to public office, entirely
unknown to the written Constitution, a veritable machine in
government, in fact, a super-government, has been created outside the pale of the fundamental Charter. There would seem to
be no legal method of attacking this practice, though it may
keep out of office men of strength and ability and put into office
men of mediocre qualifications, because the former are persona
non grata to local Congressmen or Senators, who have power to
place names in nomination to the President. Once the nomination is made, the normal practice will be approval by the Senate,
because of the party system of politics. It is matter of common
knowledge in American election machinery that the highly
important matter is to secure nomination; thereafter, if the
nominee chances to be with the winning party, he is automatically elected, though the people preferred, in the first instance,
another nominee. On the other hand, the party system of carrying on governmental affairs is itself unknown to the formal
Federal Constitution, the latter contemplating, perhaps, that
this method was an inevitable concomitant of government, and
thus adopting it sub silentio.3 0 However this may be, it would
seem that the President in numerous instances could not secure
" Kenneth C. Sears, "The Appointment of Federal District Judges,"
25 Illinois Law Review, 54.
2 "A Frontier Town and Other Essays" (ed. 1906), p. 76.
"H. W. Horwill, "The Usages of the American Constitution" (ed.
1925), pp. 131-132.
1 C. E. Merriam, "The American Party System" (ed. 1922), pp. 345
et seq.

K. L. J.-3
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adoption of his administrative program in Congress unless this
system of mutual patronage obtained between himself and individual Senators and Representatives of his own party at least,
not to mention those of opposite political affiliations. No perfect
form of government has yet been devised among men, nor can
one be formed that will fit in all its details into a rigid formulation of political doctrine or governmental machinery embodied
in a blueprint laying down the fabric of government. Some
play, some give within the machinery itself, to allow for friction
and to lubricate the mechanism, is an indispensable element.8 '
In fact, stated otherwise, practical necessities of practical government compel development of usages of government unforseen
by the drafters of the Constitution. In the words of Air. Justice
Holmes, a Constitution creating a framework of government is
made for people of varying views, and does not enact a static
government; and as Chief Justice Marshall put it, 32 a Constitution was adopted for ages to come and must therefore be adapted
from time to time to changing circumstances. It does not
follow, however, from this viewpoint that as a result we have no
longer any Constitution left to us, but only judicial decisions
that may emasculate the Constitution, or practices that may
ignore it, as some have maintained. On the contrary, the broad
formulas of government enunciated in the Constitution are still
most effective safeguards to life, liberty, and property when
interpreted and applied by a highminded judicial personnel,
trained in constitutional law and the habits of judicial reasoning, based on ideas of right and justice, and not on caprice.
There is also the protection of a vast body of precedents created
by the Supreme Court of the United States during the past
celitury construing and applying the formal Constitution, all of
which will ordinarily bind the judges in new problems. But
amendments are too cumbrous, too slow a method, to adjust
governmental needs and constitutional requirements in nnmerous situations where no vital, or new, powers of government are
being created; and, there being nothing to hinder in the written
Constitution, and being necessary by-products of practical gov1"Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine."
Holmes, J., in Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. May (1904), 194 U. S. 267.
"Mc~uisoch v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheaton, 316.
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ernment, these practices of making nominations to office would
seem to be sound political expedients.33
Some publicists are of opinion that the President, in certain
types of foreign relationships, may create extra-constitutional
practices by means of a carefully-chosen nomenclature not offensive to the Constitution itself.34 Thus, Mr. Wilson appointed
Mr. Elihu Root his speciaj "agent," but with rank of "ambassador," to represent him and make certain investigations in
Russia, not placing his name for confirmation before the Senate.
Nothing could be done about it, had there been such intention,
in a constitutional sense; for the President, in order to discharge
his duty under the Constitution, to inform Congress from time
to time of the "state of the Union," as well as to enter preliminary negotiations looking toward a treaty, or toward recognizing a foreign power which may be engaged in creating a de
jure government from a de facto one, has wide powers of discretion. Nonetheless, interesting questions might arise in a constitutional sense should Congress be. asked for funds to cover
expenses, or to provide salaries, for officials holding public office
under the United States, without having been appointed under
the method designated by the Constitution.3 5 The so-called
contingent fund386 provided for by Congress to take care of
expenses of this nature in foreign affairs would probably save
the Chief Executive embarrassment in such appointments, so
far as his own personal agents were concerned. But if Congress
abolished the contingent fund, where would be the duty on
Congress to compel its restoration? Conceding a duty, how
would it be enforced? Another method of accomplishing extraconstitutional results through a device of nomenclature is to be
found in the so-called "executive agreements" entered into
by the President, where there was no treaty to be carried out, or
no congressional authority conferred. Mr. Roosevelt entered
into a number of such agreements with foreign powers, without
sCf. "Adapting the Constitution Without Amendment," Vol. I,
"Cases on Constitutional Government," pp. 454 et -seq.
"C A. Beard, "American Government and Politics" (ed. 1924),
pp. 204-205.
"I. M. Stone, "The House of Representatives and the Treaty-Making Power," 17 Kentucky Law Journal, 216.
1 Stat. at Large, 128; and cf. Totten v. United States (1875) 92

U. S. 106.
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submitting these understandings to the Senate.s 7 Perhaps he
could have obtained no approval from the Senate, or he may
have felt the Senate's approval would be delayed, and immediate
action was necessary. In some cases, these understandings
served the bases for negotiations for subsequent treaties. But
the point is that he executed them without consulting any other
organ of government. Their legal status has been approved in
judicial decisions where the President has had congressional
authority, or where he entered into them to execute a treaty
made prior to their execution. But judicial authority is scant
for upholding his actions where he acted entirely without any
prior authority of any kind. However, as commander-in-chief,
and under other constitutional relationships, strong argument
can be made that many of these understandings were by-products
of such relationships, even though there was no affirmative or
positive authorization so to act found in the written Constitution. But not being "laws of the land" so as to bind or compel
action in a domestic sense, these executive agreements would
have found difficulty of enforcement in the courts in this country, even though the courts themselves might not have reviewed
the action of the President directly. We have decisions, however, holding that if an Executive order has been illegally issued,
the official acting under it is not protected in the event an
action by a private citizen for damages is brought against him.
Other instances of accomplishing results not known to the
Constitution might be given; but they would serve no useful
purpose other than to pile up accumulative evidence.
EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL

PRACTICES EvoLvED By CONGRESS.

As has been indicated, no justiciable issue arises for review
of alleged unconstitutional practices unless somebody feels
aggrieved at some governmental action, and can prove that he is
aggrieved. Thus, a wide avenue is opened to many probably
unconstitutional enactments which stand on the statute books
until in some actual judicial proceeding they are called in question; and, if necessary in disposing of the case, and not otherwise, they will be reviewed by the proper judicial tribunal.
7Roosevelt, "Autobiography," pp. 551-552; J. B. Moore, "Treaties
and Executive Agreements," 20 Pol. Science Quarterly, 160 et seq.;
Corwin, "The President's Control of Foreign Relations," pp. 169 et seq.
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When it is contemplated that less than one hundred federal
statutes have been overthrown throughout the life of the Republic, while thousands have been enacted, it will be seen how true
the above generalization is.
In the relationships between Congress and the President, it
rarely happens that either of these agencies of Government will
inter sa question the validity of legislation or executive orders;
that is, after the legislation has been enacted or the executive
order has been issued. Some private litigant may do so, and
frequently does, where rights are alleged to be infringed, or
duties enlarged; but seldom, if ever, in the event of a disputed
issue between Congress and the President over a question of constitutional power, will one or the other of these forces in government raise the question.38 Two instances come readily to mind.
In 1913, Congress, seeking to control presidential action in
foreign affairs, enacted 39 that "hereafter the President shall not
extend or accept any invitation to participate in any international congress, conference, or like event, without first having
specific authority of law to do so." That this was and is a
deliberate attempt to control presidential discretion in his conduct in foreign affairs must be admitted by any candid and
impartial thinker ;40 for, the President in exercising his duty to
negotiate treaties in the first instance, must, without being compelled to obtain the prior consent of Congress, have complete
freedom in entering into various conferences as prerequisites to
negotiations. Probably, although this is not conclusively settled
in our constitutional law, Congress might withhold appropriations for such purposes in the event the President negotiated
treaties which that body did not approve, although the Senate,
and not Congress, approves treaties, and this withholding of
action to enforce the treaty might more probably be the case
where Congress was controlled by a political party in opposition
to that of the President. But to require as a condition precedent
that the President first obtain consent of Congress to initiate the
international congress, is an unwarranted trespass upon the duty
I The suit now pending, ordered by the Senate, against the Federal
Power Commissioners, stands in isolation. Cf. "Washington Letter,"

Amer. Bar Assn. Journ. March, 1931.

1937 Stat. at L., c. 149, p. 913.
41 H. M. Wriston, "Executive Agents in Foreign Relations," pp. 138,
142, 143.
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of the Executive and his discretion in carrying out his duties.
While it cannot be said to be unconstitutional because not yet
so adjudicated in a proper case or controversy, nonetheless it is
extra-constitutional at least; and perhaps would, if the question
could be raised, also be declared unconstitutional, as repugnant
to the division of powers of government separating the Executive function from that of the Legislative or Judicial in the
federal fabric of government. But quacre, how could the'issue
properly be raised or presented ? The Federal Supreme Court
does not "sit at the gates" of Congress, striking down invalid
legislation, nor does it wield the "big stick" to compel co-equal
power in government, the Congress to do its duty, or to refrain
from breaching it, under the Constitution. So to think of the
Court is the great popular delusion about it. Hence, extraconstitutional government obtains between the Congress and the
Chief Executive, unless the latter chooses to ignore it and assume
the risks and the embarrassment to which he may be experienced.
The other example is equally patent in extra-constitutionality. This is the Resolution of the Senate,4 1 of October 18, 1921,
made a reservation to the treaties of peace between the Government of the United States and the respective Governments of
Germany, Austria, and Hungary, providing that the "United
States shall not be represented or participate in any body,
agency, or commission, nor shall any person represent the United
States as a member of any body, agency, or commission in which
the United States is authorized to participate by this Treaty,
unless and until an Act of Congress of the United States shall
provide for such representation or participation." The practice of the Chief Executive, particularly Mr. Harding, in resorting to "unofficial observers" is well known in our recent political and governmental maneuvers. Whether he felt that he was
bound by this Resolution so to do, on advice of his legal and
political advisers, or whether he did this out of a spirit of
camaraderie for his former associates in the Senate, is conjectural and problematical. Nevertheless, this Resolution would
appear to be as much an invasion of presidential power as the
law of 1913, already mentioned. 42 For the President, under
42 Stat. at L., 1945, 1949, 1954.
"*Wigmore, "May the Federal Senate Hamstring the Executive's
Power to Confer with Other Nations?" 20 Illinois Law Review, 688.
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the duty to execute the federal laws, of which a treaty is by the
Constitution declared "the supreme law of the land," has wide
choice of means in securing their enforcement; moreover, in his
relations with foreign powers under his constitutional right "to
send and receive ambassadors," broad powers not only of recognizing new foreign States or governments, but also carrying on
dealings with them, are of necessity and constitutional right
permitted the President. In the Resolution of 1921, appears to
be a further attempt to "hamstring" the Executive in his own
constitutional functions. But in none of the two examples cited
has any question, so far as is known, been raised by the Presidents since 1913, challenging either the power of Congress or
the jurisdiction of the Senate in these matters. Whatever right
the Congress has to refuse legislation appropriating funds to
43
execute treaties where funds are necessary, is besides the issue.
During discussions relative to the Jay Treaty in the time of
Washington, the lower House, through Jeffersonian practice,
sought to prevent enactment of such legislation, but the Federalists were able eventually to defeat such proposal. As Mr.
Willoughby has pointed out, 44 while the Senate in its prerogative of approving treaties has never conceded the power of the
lower House to refuse to vote appropriations for executing
treaties where such are necessary, nonetheless provisos by the
Senate to treaties of that character have usually been inserted.
Mr. Taft was of the opinion that under its prerogative to enact
money bills, the lower House was under no legal duty to provide
such legislation in the enforcement of treaties where money was
necessary, although he was of opinion that there was a "moral"
duty so to do. 45 However, the issue raised by the Resolution
of 1921 is not of that character, and, as already pointed out,
attempted to thwart presidential action looking toward preliminary conferences and conventions.
In the legal questions presented by the Resolution, no justiciable issue has been presented by any private litigant; thus there
has been no judicial declaration of unconstitutionality. A
common practice in somewhat delicate problems of this nature,
where the conflicting claims of co-equal powers in government
"4Supra,note 35.
"1 Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 555-560.
Taft, op. cit., p. 115.
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are at issue, is for the judicial tribunal to evade the question,
sidestepping it if it is at all possible, by deciding the issue on
some other ground. Perhaps a court might find that a private
litigant raising the issue had not really been damnified, conceding
he could originate a case or controversy attacking these alleged
infringements on Executive power. That the President himself
would challenge the validity of these measures, while not
unthinkable, is hardly probable, so far as making them outright
issues is concerned. He might ignore them in practice, and
then there would be no remedy available against him other than
impeachment, which seems both an unlikely as well as an impracticable procedure. If Andrew Johnson could not be impeached
on the charges made against him, all the more on lesser charges
would it be improbable. Suffice it to say, these attempts by
Congress and the Senate have all the ear-marks of extra-constitutionality, enacted probably because of a feeling that their
own constitutional prerogatives had been either ignored or
imposed upon by certain Presidents in those peaceful conflicts
which are almost certain to arise between the President and
Congress in the execution of administrative policies, especially
where the latter is controlled by a political party opposite to
that of the President. After all, the measures discussed are
probably political maneuverings, more or less innocuous.
The Senate has attracted further publicity to itself more
recently in its practice of excluding from membership Senators
elected by constituent States who, in the judgment of the Senate,
were not qualified to sit in its House. By Article 1, section 5,
the Constitution expressly confers on the Senate, in fact each
House, power to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; but the Constitution further provides,
in Article 5, that "no State, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." No case or controversy in the judicial sense has thus far been decided raising
the relative powers of the Senate under the provisions quoted,
other than cases of contempt proceedings to compel witnesses to
testify or submit evidence where investigations are carried on
relative to candidates for the Senate or House. 46 However, it
is matter of common knowledge that the Senate did exclude
from membership William S. Vare, Senator from the State of
"Bq3rry v. United States (1929), 279 U. S. 597.
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Pennsylvania, and Frank L. Smith, from the State of Illinois,
because of allegations and proof of unduly large expenditures
by interested parties in the primaries. Although in the decision
of Newberry v. United States,47 in 1921, the Federal Supreme
Court, by a 5 to 4 vote, had held that the primaries were not
part of the elections themselves, as to be within the legislative
jurisdiction of Congress, nevertheless the Senate under its power
to scrutinize and determine the qualifications of its members
could inquire into the question how much third parties had
financed the nominee in the primaries, which undoubtedly is
sound. How far, on the other hand, preliminary investigations
could be made of a mere nominee, not yet elected to the Senate,
as was done in the case of Ruth Hanna McCormick by the Nye
Committee, is not so clear. But a strong case supportive of the
right of the Senate even in this investigation could be made on
the ground that the Senate has a right to protect itself by
getting the evidence early, without waiting until the nominee
were elected, if at all. So far as is known, in Mrs. McCormick's
case there was no allegation of expenditure of funds other than
her own, which likewise puts another viewpoint into the case.
However, the real point in excluding a Senator who has been
elected, but not yet been seated in the Senate, is whether the
Senate is limited in its power by constitutional provisions; in
other words, whether the power to exclude is absolute, or is
subject to constitutional limitations. 48 By some it has been
argued that the correct constitutional procedure should be to
seat the Senator, and thereafter, to exclude on a two-thirds vote,
for otherwise the selection itself of a Senator is in the hands of
the Senate, and not in the people of the State which elected him,
despite the defect in his qualifications pointed out by the
Senate. 43 It has, however, been further argued, in particular by
James Al. Beck, 50 that the Senate is by the Constitution restricted in its exclusion powers to those qualifications mentioned
expressly, or by inference, within the Constitution itself, namely,
age, residence in the State from which he comes, validity of
-1 (1921) 256 U. S. 232.
"Raymond D. Thurber, "The Case of 'Senator Smith,'" 6 New
York University Law Review, 117; C. C. Tansill, "The Smith-Vare Case
and its Relation to Senate Procedure," 8 National University Law
Review, 3.
"Thurber, supra, note 47.
"J3ames M. Beck, "The Vanishing Rights of the States" (1929),
chs. 1-6; ibid., "May It Please The Court," ch. XIL
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credentials, etc., and there is no power whatever to exclude on
any other grounds. As Mr. Beck has said: "Thus a coup d'etat
is at any time possible. * * * If such a power exists, then the
greatest of all States' rights has become little more than a 'scrap
of paper' ".51 Taking this view of the matter, the various
provisions of the Constitution regarding equal suffrage of the
States in the Senate, with the right of the Senate itself to
determine the qualifications of its own members, are harmonized
and made consistent. Such a view has much to commend itself
52
to reason and good government.
It is not possible, under present constitutional practice and
theory, for a "ease" or "controversy" to be framed before a
proper federal judicial tribunal by means of which challenge
can be had of this action of the Senate. For, if jurisdiction
were taken by a federal court and the merits of the controversy
heard, which is doubtful, there would be no effective method of
enforcing the judicial decision, because if the Senate refused to
abide by it, contempt proceedings could be of no avail, in that
the Senators are free from arrest, as well as other judicial
processes, while the Senate is in session; and it would, of course,
be of no value to the ousted complainant Senator to take steps
to obtain relief subsequent to an adjournment of the Senate
when process might be served. Moreover, it is extremely doubtfAl whether the federal court, assuming it took jurisdiction,
would enter upon the merits of the issues involved, in that they
were questions solely to be settled by that branch of Federal
Government in which the Constitution had reposed the power to
make the decision in the first place. It would be quite a simple
solution of the controversy fGr the court to invoke the doctrine
of "political" questions and dismiss the entire controversy from
consideration, as an invasion within or trespass upon an area
committed olely to the determination of a co-equal power in
government. In such constitutional issues as these it would
Supra, Note 49, "The Vanishing Rights of the States," pp. 26, 55.
And see "Joint Resolution of Illinois Legislature" of June 16 and 21,
1927 (Laws of Illinois, 1927, pp. 884-886).
"Other publicists have taken the position that the Governor may
appoint by ad interrim appointment some other individual acceptable
to the Federal Senate, and thus the State not be deprived of its representation. The difficulty with this vieiv is said to be that the appointment of the Governor in such case is usually restricted to situations
where there is a vacancy, and that the elections have indicated otherwise. But this would not seem a valid objection, in my opinion.
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seem desirable to be able to call upon the Supreme Court of the
United States for a so-called declaratory judgment by the
litigant, or advisory opinion6 - by the Senate itself, construing
the Federal Constitution with authority and finality, even
though there were no actual means available to enforce the socalled moot judgment. Under present constitutional machinery,
of course, such a method is not allowable because of absence of
an actual case or controversy wherein some litigant is attempting
to prove himself aggrieved in his property or personal rights.
Were an amendment to the Constitution drafted and ratified
providing for such a procedure, public opinion would be the
sanction of enforcement after the judgment had been rendered.
On the other hand, under the power of Congress to create socalled "legislative" courts, 54 it is possible that no amendment
would be necessary to provide for a tribunal with power to
render these declaratory or advisory opinions, for Congress has
wide powers in the conferring of judicial power on purely legislative courts, as, for example, it has done in the jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims to hear suits against the United States in
contracts, express or implied, "not sounding in tort." The
large difficulty in such a procedure would be that this tribunal
would not have the same degree of prestige in construing the
Constitution as the Supreme Court of the United States would
and does have, and that Congress, having created the tribunal,
could also refuse to follow its decisions. Moreover, no appeal
would lie to the Supreme Court itself in that the latter as a
constitutional court could not by Congress be empowered to
assume such jurisdiction because a case or controversy was
lacking. Thus, all in all, the Senate in taking the position it
has in excluding certain Senators because in its judgment their
qualifications were inadequate, is able to do so without challenge
under the Constitution.
3A somewhat similar provision is found in the new German Constitution for settling conflicting jurisdictional disputes between the
Government of the Reich and the respective State governm6nts. Cf.
Walter Simons, Ex-President of the Supreme Court of the Reich,
"Relation of the German Judiciary to the Executive and Legislative
Branches of the Government," 54 Reports of the American Bar Association, p. 226, at p. 237. Judge Simons, however, confesses that he prefers
the American system of not giving advisory opinions so far as the
Federal Supreme Court is concerned.
'"And as found also in Bo parte Bakelite Corporation (1929) 279
U. S. 438; and see Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts," 43 Harvard LaW
Review, 894.
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The Senate has been charged with -creating extra-constitutional government, if not "unconstitutional" rule, in various
practices within that body during the process of legislation, or
seeking information on which it alleges legislation is to be
enacted. My colleague, Colonel Wigmore, has within recent
years written profusely and authoritatively on these subjects;55
in fact, it may with truth be said that it was he who first threw
the searchlight of criticism on this development in constitutional
law in this country. The American authority on the law of
evidence in the Anglo-Saxon world, quite naturally has reacted
in a hostile fashion to the so-called "grand jury" and inquisitorial practices of the Senate in making investigations into the
business and other practices of individuals thought to possess
information that might expose certain individuals and corporations to unwelcome publicity, if not to prosecution, for violation
of federal law. Not being expressly bound in the Constitution
by any particular rules of evidence, senatorial committees
engaged in investigating numerous problems alleged to be within
their jurisdiction may be governed by mixed motives, and probe
into matters and ask questions of subpoenaed witnesses entirely
irrelevant and unconstitutional if presented in a court and
judged by common law rules of evidence. Unfortunately, the
judicial decisions on this subject are not as precise or profuse
in their discussions of constitutional safeguards, as they might
be.56 Suffice to say, the holdings which do raise problems that
are more or less pertinent, appear to require the Senate or a
committee to allege at least that the investigation is to concern
a proposed legislative enactment, or relates to the qualifications
of its members, or is within some other power granted to the
Senate by the Constitution, and that the questions asked on
these subjects must have pertinency to the subjects being investigated as conditions precedent to punishment of a recalcitrant
witness for contempt. But no particular requirement is laid
down by the courts as to admitting evidence, or to harassing a
witness, except that he may generally refuse to answer questions
0 Wigmore, "The Unconstitutional Senate," 20 Illinois Law Review,
61; ibid., "The Federal Senate as a Fifth Wheel," 24 Illinois Law
Review, 89.
"As summarized in McGrain v. Daugherty (1927), 273 U. S. 135;
and cf. James Parker Hall, "Power of Senate to Attach Witness for
Refusal to Testify Before Committee," 22 Illinois Law Review, 194;
F. R. Coudert, "Congressional Inquisition versus Individual Liberty,"
15 Virginia Law Review, 537.
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put him where the answers or evidence furnished would incriminate him if there is no immunity statute protecting him in his
answers. The aggrieved individual in these senatorial grand
jury inquisitions, as they have been called, will have his day in
court if contempt proceedings are instituted against him and he
is taken into custory, by petitioning for the writ of habeas corpus
to that federal judicial tribunal that may have jurisdiction over
the person thus holding him. On the hearing in court, all these
matters above discussed will be considered by the court on the
rule to show cause why the petitioner should not be discharged.
Needless to say, however, the individual questioned by a committee of the Senate or the lower House can, during the process
of inquisition, be exposed to public ridicule, contempt, and even
hatred, because of the pressure exerted on him at the time,
largely at the hands of investigators, who, conceding their
motives to be of the highest, know that they are not bound by
any particular constitutional rules in the proceedings other than
those already mentioned. The restraint of high-mindedness is
often flagrantly absent in these extra-constitutional practices
of government. But a desire to play a political role or to make
the front page of the newspapers must and will be served in
some of these investigations by the Senate.
The method by which an individual Senator may prevent
not only consideration, but also enactment itself, of important
legislation, has likewise been attacked as not only an extraconstitutional, but even an unconstitutional, development of
government. Colonel Wigmore has referred to this practice as
the "liberum veto," in these words: "Today no legislation can
be enacted in the Senate (except on the few issues which directly
involve opposite party policies, e. g., the tariff) if a single
Senator forbids. This is not in the Constitution. Nor will you find
it in the Rules of the Senate. It is a tacit understanding. But it
is as solid a fact as the Grand Canon of the Colorado. It is called
senatorial courtesy. * * * It is not merely technically unconstitutional; it is actually blocking all legislation." 57 It will be
recalled that when Vice-President Dawes first presided over the
Senate, a vigorous attack was made by him on this practice.
Nothing resulted, however, from this well-meaning speech to
I1Supra, Note 54, in 20 Illinois Law Review, at p. 62; and see
ibid., "Scopotropismic Senators Stalled by a Sturdy Scot," 22 Illinois
Law Review, 883.
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speed up the work of the Senate by abolishing this senatorial
courtesy practice. It may have resulted in alienation from Mr.
Dawes of certain Senators of influence in his party; that it
helped him politically is doubtful. That the rule is still in force
is certain. On the other hand, too severe condemnation must
not be made of this practice on the part of senators. For government is a practical matter, and bargaining for advantage is
one of the incidents of politics. Moreover, it is also true that
each senator has the right, as well as the duty, to weigh proposed
legislation with care, so that no undue haste will result in unwise
and unsound legislation. Every conceivable angle of a proposed
bill can thus be considered even before it is introduced formally
into the Senate. Critics of the practice, on the other hand,
maintain that it results in the creation of a "fifth wheel" to
the vehicle of government, which impedes its functions; or, to
change the metaphor, it gives as many veto powers over proposed
legislation as there are senators, and thus is unconstitutional.
Granting all this, what is to be done about it? Is there any way
to compel removal of this extra-constitutional practice? Probably not, unless individual senators in future are led to believe
that it is destroying their usefulness as legislators, and they then
will agree not to practice this so-called "senatorial courtesy."
That they will do so seems unlikely so long as the returns from
this powerful source of bargaining power are so valuable for
practical political purposes.
Regarding the geographical limitations imposed on congressmen in the Federal Government, there has been another extraconstitutional development, not found within the formal constitution itself. Beyond requiring that a representative when
elected must be a resident of the State from which he comes,
58
the Constitution imposes no further geographical restriction.
The constitutional theory is that the constituency of a congressman is the entire State itself, not some localized area or district;
in fact, congressional districts themselves are unknown to the
Constitution. There is no argument being now made that these
usages which have grown up unknown to constitutional government are unwise or impractical; the sole motive is one of exposi5
1Horwill, supra, Note 29, ch. IX, "The Resident Congressman."
And see further, "Residence Requirements for Representatives," 12
Constitutional Review, 227; Robert Luce, "Legislative Assemblies"
(ed. 1924) pp. 223-224.

EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL

GOVERNMENT

tion of these developments outside the pale of the Constitution.
Lord Bryce designated the practice of compelling a congressman
to be a resident of a certain district within the State from which
he comes as "a custom old, universal, and as strong as law
itself." But that a statute restricting nominees to certain local
residential districts would be constitutional is doubtful, in view
of the express provisions found in the Constitution. Hence, the
sanction is found outside the Constitution, even though not
expressly prohibited by it. Various effects follow from this
extra-constitutional practice, of vital consequence to the nation
as a whole. It excludes from Congress able men who chance to
live in a congressional district where already there is a plethora
of political incumbents; nor can these men offer themselves to
other constituencies where there is a dearth of politically qualified aspirants-unless, of course, they change their party affiliations, an infrequent practice. After election, the congressman
must see that he pleases his own local constituency, or his career
is at an end. As has been well said by Mr. Horwill, in "The
Usages of the American Constitution:' --" The knowledge of
this sword of Damocles hanging over him stimulates many a
representative to exert himself inordinately in securing largesse
for his constituency from the public purse. ' 59 Sectionalism
and parochialism are thus paramount in motivating conduct of
representatives; while this has advantages for government, it
also has obvious disadvantages, not pertinent to raise here. The
point being made is that one's political career has doubtful
continuity; for if he gains too much strength, he runs the risk
of having a gerrymander practiced on him through a revision
of the number of congressional districts by the State legislature
under control of the opposite party; if he does not please his
constituents, someone else will be chosen by the local residential
party bosses who will "deliver the goods." Professor C. A.
Beard has said that men of ability and independence of viewpoint, men who seek a permanent career, do not as a rule fit into
this system which has developed outside the Constitution; but
that, on the contrary, the system develops "shrewd men with
the qualifications of the successful horse trader," rather than
statesmen. 60 Perhaps this characterization is too inclusive and
untrue because of its broad generalization, for there are, and
' Op. cit., p. 163.

0 Supra, Note 34, p. 29.
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have been, numerous able congressmen and senators whose native
ability alone has elevated them to official position. Furthermore,
holding office gives the incumbent an advantage that the outsider
does not possess, so that he undergoes an education that to some
extent qualifies him if, at first, he lacks in qualification. But in
view of the fact that senators are often recruited from the ranks
of the congressmen who have "evolved" through the process
described, and inasmuch as there have been numerous senators,
in the words of Dr. Glenn Frank,61 "who bring to the politics of
a planet the vision of a parish," there is much truth in the statement that the present system of the resident congressman,
unknown in England, does not make for the most effective and
highest type of government in America.
In the growth of extra-constitutional government as it
relates to the legislative branch, it must not be overlooked that
there have been instances of nonfeasance on the part of Congress,
i. e., cases where Congress has itself refused to obey the plain
dictates of the Constitution, and followed a practice of carrying
on government unknown to the Constitution. Reference is in
part to the refusal of Congress to re-apportion its membership
after the census of 1910,62 probably explicable on the ground
that the urbanization of the country would upset the equilibrium
enjoyed by the rural elements in the House of Representatives.
Nevertheless, the duty is plain, and stated in terms of positive
requirement, that the House should re-apportion its membership
after each census. There being no way in which to compel Congress to discharge its duty, no steps were taken until 1929 to
remedy this situation, so that it might truthfully be said that
since the census of 1910, the House of Representatives has
carried on an extra-constitutional government, in refusing to
re-organize and redistrict its members on the increased basis of
population. Yet nothing could be done about it under the Constitution. An extra-constitutional practice had grown up alongside the Constitution. The Act of 1929, in at last making provision for re-apportionment, recognized the duty on the part of
"An American Looks at his World" (ed. 1923), p. 339.
Chaffee, "Congressional Reapportionment," 42 Harvard Law
Review, 1015. State legislatures have likewise been derelict In discharging similar mandatory requirements. Cf. Fergus v. Kinney
(1929), 333 Ill. 437, and State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham (1892), 83
Wis. 90.
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Congress, but actual re-apportionment has not been, and will not
63
be, made probably for some time.
Nor has Congress provided adequate machinery by statute
or other enforcement methods of the extradition clause in the
Constitution, which provides that fugitives from justice fleeing
to another State from that in which the crime was committed
shall be delivered up on demand made on the Governor of the
asylum State. 4 Again, Congress has been charged with failure
to enact legislation penalizing State authorities in imposing
educational qualifications on colored voters and white alike, but
which results in actual exclusion of colored citizens from the
franchise, in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, providing
that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 6 5
Failure to act in these instances, as well as others which might
be mentioned, has perpetuated extra-constitutional practices in
government for which Congress has received criticism.
Exposition of the above developments in government
naturally raises the query, how remedy these situations? This
inquiry is not easily answered; no rough and ready, no precise
or exact method of dealing with the problems is available. If
one thinks that the Supreme Court is the vigilant sentinel sitting
at the gate of Congress, 66 ready to strike down invalid acts, or to
impose constitutional duties on government, he is indulging in
a popular delusion; for that tribunal has no such powers outside a "case" or "controversy" properly raising the questions.
And, as already indicated, often no justiciable issues can be
framed to effectuate such a desired review by the Court; and
likewise, often the Court will evade the issues presented by holding them to be "political" questions, that is, questions better
decided by the other departments of government to which, it is
said, the Constitufion has committed them for solution. In truth,
46 Stat. c. 28, see. 22, June 18, 1929, 2 U. S. C. A. sec. 64a, tit. 2.
" U. S. Rev. Stats. sec. 5278 reiterates substantially only the
Federal constitutional provision (Art. IV, sec. 2), stating it "shall be
the duty" of the executive authority of the asylum State to surrender
the fugitive from justice, providing no other enforcement machinery.
Cf. Ex parte Germain (1927), 258 Mass. 289.
"And see Guinn v. Unitea States (1915), 258 U. S.347. I personally
doubt whether Congress has really been derelict in its duty here.
"Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution,"
41 Harvard Law Rev. 121, at p. 123; and see John W. Davis, Presidential Address, 48 Amer. Bar Assn. Rpts. 193, 204.
1
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there are loopholes in the Constitution which permit these extraconstitutional practices to grow and flourish unchallenged by
law. They are evolutions of the national mind and life that
are unavoidable, and but illustrate the great and profound truth
that that mind and life cannot be confined within four corners
of a written instrument like a Constitution. Life is ever flowing,
in incessant change, and no Canute of written governmental
formulas can stay its progress. Extra-constitutional developments are inevitable by-products.
EDWIN
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